Abstract
Introduction
Electronic commerce is becoming increasingly common on the Internet, and many security-related electronic payment systems have been built on the basis of various cryptographic methods and standards. These applications are designed to protect important properties of solutions from anticipated types of attack such as eavesdropping, forgery, and espionage. We think that one such important property is a temporal one. For example, an electronic payment server verifies whether the system clock of the end user's computer is within a permitted range of time-drift, because the shopping date measured in the server and the user's record created in the client must be in agreement. In practice, there are many timecritical applications other than payment applications. To use public facilities such as tennis courts in Japan, we usually apply for a lottery ticket by mailing an application form to the appropriate office. Since the application can be received only during a specified period, applicants must pay attention to such temporal constraints. In most cases, the postmark is used as official proof of the application. In a few cases, the arrival time of the application form is used. However, the former seems to be more acceptable to applicants, because there is no official proof in the latter case. We think that the importance of the postmark lies in the provability it provides for temporal activities such as time-critical submissions. In other words, this important temporal property should be protected from adversaries who may forge or alter it. This paper explains the danger of such attacks and a defense strategy. Then we propose a secure electronic submission protocol that uses a trusted third party to provide temporal accountability. We also propose a temporal accountability logic, which is an extension of Kailar's work [K96] . The proposed logic, unlike Kailar's, is capable of representing the provability of temporal activities. We analyze the proposed protocol by applying our temporal accountability logic, and describe some modifications of the protocol, which reduce the total number of flows while keeping the protocol as logically secure as the original one in terms of temporal accountability.
Related Work
Kailar proposed an accountability logic [K96] for electronic commerce protocols such as payment protocols and public key distribution protocols. He defines accountability as a property whereby the association of a unique originator with an object or action can be proved to a third party. Provability has an important role in the analysis of accountability. Since time-critical applications require proofs that guarantee the temporal activities of each principal, we think that Kailar's accountability logic can be extended for use in analyzing such applications.
Although the original logic allows some temporal context such as a During and Until property to be added to represent the validation period of security-related information such as a time-critical delegation key, we extend the original logic so that the logic can represent the temporal accountability. Much work has been done on belief logic in the analysis of key management protocols. Burrows, Abadi, and Needham proposed a belief logic for authentication, which is used for reasoning about authentication protocols and for detecting redundancies and security flaws [BAN90] . In belief logic, each party is said to have a belief when he/she is convinced of a statement after several communications. There is a difference between belief logic and accountability logic as regards provability to other principals. Stubblebine extended the previous belief logic and proposed the notion of recent-secure authentication [S95] , which is based on the work of [LABW92], [ABLP93] , and [SO94] . The statement has three time properties: at, notbefore, and notafter. These temporal properties were created to represent the secure channel of a principal and freshness constraints for entity authentication. Our method assumes the existence of a trusted third party and the absence of clock synchronization among principals. On the other hand, Stubblebine's work does not assume a trusted third party and requires clock synchronization. Stubblebine and Wright extend BAN logic in order to reach a more precise temporal notion [SW96] . Their logic has three temporal properties: at a certain time t, at a certain time between t1 and t2, and at all times between t1 and t2. They also assume that all principals have their own local times and need to synchronize them. While the primary purpose of their logic is to reason about the soundness of protocols that use certificates which include security-related information with a validation period, our method is to reason about the soundness of protocols that use trusted timestamps which can offer temporal proof. Haber and Stornetta proposed a hash-based timestamp method [HS90] . Since their method can prove the time at which data were received, it is possible to combine their protocol and ours; however, we omit the explanation.
In this paper, we analyze various types of attack, including conspiracy attacks, described in Section 2. Section 3 describes a secure electronic submission protocol that uses a trusted third party. We propose a temporal accountability logic in Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze the proposed protocol by applying the temporal accountability logic. In section 6, we describe further considerations related to protocol analysis.
Attacks and Defense Measures for Temporal Transactions
In this section, we describe various types of attack on secure temporal transactions, and propose defense measures. We also explain why a trusted third party that guarantees the accuracy of the current time is required.
Difficulties
In Internet credit-payment systems, a buyer can easily verify a purchase statement by comparing the price on the receipt and the amount paid later from his/her bank account. However, how can he/she verify that the merchant's system clock is always exact? Such verification becomes important if the merchant engages in temporal transactions such as discount selling during a limited period. If an order is sent by electronic mail, the mail server's system clock is trusted, and the buyer receives a distribution acknowledgement from the mail server. In this way, the buyer can verify that the discount rate on the purchased item is correct. However, we must handle the situation in a more general way. We list several situations that can be more general or less secure:
Á The user directly connects to the application server (not via a trusted third-party agent).
Á The application server's system clock is not trusted, and may therefore be slow or fast.
Á The user's system clock is not trusted, and may therefore be slow or fast.
Á A malicious party may alter or forge temporal records stored in the user's machine or server. With these assumptions, we describe possible malicious attacks on temporal transactions.
Attacks
We divide possible attacks against temporal transactions into two categories:
ÁÂ Adjustment of the system clock forward or backward by the user, the server, or both in conspiracy ÃÂ Forgery, alteration, or removal of temporal records by the user, the server, or both in conspiracy One example of an attack on a server by putting forward the system clock is as follows. If the user sends an application form to a public facility office close to the deadline, and the server clock is set a little fast, the application will not be received owing to its late arrival. Another example of a conspiracy attack involving forgery of temporal records concerns paper submission. If an author cannot complete his/her paper by the due date, he/she may request one of the program editors to include the paper even if it is not received by the due date. If the postmark on the envelope is not used as a proof of the submission, the editor can easily add the requested paper to the officially received submissions. In this case, the author and program editor mount a conspiracy attack that involves forging temporal records so that the paper appears to have arrived before the due date.
Solutions
Some countermeasures against the above attacks are as follows: A1) Periodic adjustment of the system clock A2) Distribution of temporal transactions on multiple machines A3) Use of a trusted third party that offers a correct timestamp B1) Distribution of temporal transaction records to all principals B2) Registration of temporal transaction records with another trusted third party B3) Timestamping of temporal transaction records by a trusted third party For A1, the system clock can be automatically adjusted by running the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [M91] or by running a Global Positioning System driver that provides accurate information on the current time. However, we think that this solution is not sufficiently secure against attacks of type A, because the person with the highest administrative access rights can easily change the system clock at any time. For A2, Franklin and Reiter presented a distributed server group computation that ensures the integrity of temporal transactions for sealedbid auction [FR95] . However, this solution still suffers from the above access right problem. For A3, a trusted timestamp server is assumed. For B categories, note that temporal transaction records must be published outside the server; otherwise, there is no way of preventing forgery, alteration, or removal of records inside the server through attacks of type B. For B1, all principals must monitor the server's temporal transactions synchronously. For B2, a trusted third party for registration must provide a huge amount of storage space for the expected transactions. For B3, a trusted timestamp server is assumed. We previously presented an auction protocol in which the temporal transaction records are timestamped by a trusted server [K98] .
For reasons of feasibility and trustability, we adopt measures A3 and B3 in this paper. We assume the existence of a trusted timestamp server that adds a correct timestamp to the temporal transaction data, that cannot be altered or forged. In this way, we can protect the security of temporal transactions from attacks of types A and B. Transaction records that contain time-sensitive information are accompanied by temporal proofs generated by the timestamp server. The advantage of this method is that application servers do not have to provide a correct time service even though they provide timesensitive services to the users. In other words, the timestamp and timestamp server have the same roles as a postmark on a physical envelope and a post office, respectively.
We define the accurate time in this paper as Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), because the latter is used in Stratum 1 of the NTP. The UTC is calculated from both the International Atomic Time (TAI) and corrections for small changes to the TAI determined by the U.S. Naval Observatory and other observatories [M91] .
Secure Electronic Submission Protocol
We think that the most typical application involving temporal transactions is electronic submission of an application that is permitted within a certain period of time. Note that it is not as easy to design a submission protocol as might be imagined. If an applicant takes a timestamp from the timestamp server for his/her application before the closing time for submission and sends it to the submission server, can it be satisfactorily proved that the submission is correct? Some people may suspect the applicant of sending the application before the opening time for submission. Others may suspect the applicant of sending the application after the closing time for submission, even though his/her submission was generated before the closing time. Therefore we begin by stating the general requirements for the electronic submission protocol: R1) The receiver must not receive any applications except during the permitted period. R2) The applicants must submit application data during the permitted period. R3) The receiver cannot forge, alter, or remove any application once it has been received R4) The receiver must receive applications that arrive during the permitted period.
Notation
We use the following notation. Principals are denoted by capital letters {A, B, Á. We use A to denote Alice, who is an applicant, B for Bob, who is the receiver of the application forms sent by multiple applicants, and T for Trent, who is the trusted timestamp service provider. Messages are denoted by small letters {x, yÁ except for t. We use t as a time parameter. The predefined time parameters are t s , which denotes the opening time for submission, and t e , which denotes the closing time for submission. K A and K A -1 denote the public key and private key, respectively, for the principal A. 
Ai . "," denotes an operation for concatenating parameters.
General Assumptions
The general assumptions for this protocol are as follows: N1) The time stamp service provider is trusted to provide the current time accurately and to generate correct timestamps. We assume the existence of another function to send notification to other entities at previously specified times. N2) The applicant's system clock and receiver's system clock are not trusted, and may be fast or slow. We do not assume any clock synchronization for them. We consider another situation in section 6, in which the receiver's clock is accurate. N3) The receiver is assumed to offer submission services to all applicants fairly. N4) The computing resources for the receiver and the timestamp server are assumed to be unlimited. It takes only a short time to communicate or execute the protocol. N5) The digital signature algorithm is based on public key cryptography, and it is impossible to forge or alter a signature owing to the computational complexity. N6) It is assumed that no denial-of-service attack by a malicious party occurs.
N7)
The channel for communication among the principals is assumed to be secured in order to preserve the confidentiality of each message.
General Flow
The submission protocol consists of four steps: a preliminary step, an opening step, a submission step, and a closing step. In the preliminary step, Bob asks Trent to notify Bob at the opening time and closing time for submission. In the opening step, which is taken when notification is received from Trent, an opening timestamp is used to guarantee that the applicant generates an application after the opening time for submission. In the submission step, one or more applicants, Alice, send applications to Bob and receive timestamps in acknowledgment of their submissions. In the closing step, Bob acquires a closing timestamp and sends it back to Alice.
We explain the meaning of each protocol flow step by step. In the Preliminary step, Bob requests Trent to notify Bob at the opening time and closing time for submission because Bob may not have the accurate time, from assumption N2. "NR" denotes a notification service request and "NA" denotes a notification acknowledgment, which is different from a timestamping service. We discuss another scenario, which assumes that Bob has the accurate time and does not require the notification service. Bob receives acknowledgment of the notification in message 2. Trent notifies Bob at the opening time for submission in message 3. Bob sends a description of a call for submission to Trent, which means that Bob declares the opening of the period for electronic submission at that time. Trent returns a timestamp, that is, a signature on Bob's message with a correct current time value t s without verifying the contents of the message, desc.
Instead of using messages 4 and 5, we can also apply the Time Stamp Protocol [ACPZ98] with some modifications. The purpose of this timestamp is to provide a proof that meets requirement R2 in message 8. Alice retrieves Trent's timestamp in message 7 by making a query with id, which is the index number of the call for submission. Alice sends an electronic submission to Bob in message 8. The message consists of application data x i , the origin, the destination, the timestamp, and the applicant's signature on them. Since the timestamp, which is Trent's signature, can only be generated at the opening time for submission, Alice and Bob can prove that the applicant's submission was sent after time t s . If it is before the closing time for submission, Bob makes Trent issue a timestamp on each application in messages 9 and 10, and returns the timestamp to each applicant in message 11. If Bob receives the application after the closing time for submission, Bob returns message 15 
Temporal Accountability Logic
In this section, we present a temporal accountability logic that is an extension of Kailar's framework. The original work is capable of analyzing payment protocols and key distribution protocols, and consists of logical constructs, analysis assumptions, and logical postulates. We add nine new logical constructs and ten new postulates to allow analysis of temporal accountability, which is not possible in the original framework. After briefly explaining the original framework, we describe the proposed logic. We review most of the original constructs and postulates but not all of them.
Original Logical Constructs
The Strong Proof construct is denoted as A ÁÂÃÄÅAEÇÈ x , which means that a principal A can prove statement x to any principal B. After the sequence of operations, B is convinced of x without any secret y being revealed to B. 
Original Postulates Used in the Analysis
The original work uses a notation for the postulates similar to that of [BAN90] .
P; Q R means that if statements P and Q hold simultaneously, then statement R holds. ";" denotes conjunction and not temporal ordering. We use the following postulates in this paper. 
Temporal Logical Constructs
We propose the following temporal logical constructs:
Á The Generation Before construct is denoted as x &ÈÃÈÅÂÈ!'È(AEÅÈ t, which means that the message x was generated before or at time t, and therefore x exists at time t and also continues to exist after t according to the usual temporal causal relation. Note that we use the words "after" and "before" in the construct names a little differently from the usual meaning, which does not include a terminal point of time literally.
Á The Generation At construct is denoted as x &ÈÃÈÅÂÈ!É t, which means that the message x is generated at time t. &ÈÃÈÅÂÈ!É differs from &ÈÃÈÅÂÈ!'È(AEÅÈ in that the former represents the generated time of x explicitly whereas the latter cannot.
Á A Generation After construct is denoted as x &ÈÃÈÅÂÈ!É(ÈÅ t, which means that the message x is generated at or after time t. This construct is weaker than &ÈÃÈÅÂÈ!É, because it conveys no information about when x is generated.
Á A Timestamp construct is denoted as x $)ÈÂ)0È!" t " K -1 , which means that the message x is timestamped with t with the key K -1 at time t. This construct has the similar meaning as 
Temporal Postulates
We propose the following temporal postulates:
The Generation Before postulate relates the provability of a timestamp and the Generation Before construct. If a principal A receives a message x that is timestamped with t with a private key K -1 , and the timestamp is issued by a principal T, and T is trusted as regards the accuracy of his/her time, then A can prove that message x is generated before or at time t.
The Generation At postulate relates the provability of a timestamp and the Generation At construct. If a principal A receives a message x that is timestamped with t with a private key K -1 at time t, and the timestamp is issued by a principal T, and T is trusted as regards the accuracy of his/her time, then A can prove that T's signature itself, which is denoted by (x $)È Ã" t " K -1 ), is generated at t.
Generation Relation1 postulate describes a relation between the Generation At construct and the Generation Before construct. If a principal A can prove that x is generated at t, and that x is a component of y, then A can prove that y is generated at or after t.
For example, suppose there are two messages, x1 and x2, and x1 is generated at t1, and x2 at t2. If we think of a combination of the above messages, x1 and x2, the combined message cannot be generated before t2, because x2 is generated at t2. This implies that combined messages must be generated at the latest time for the generation of each components. Therefore Generation Relation1 holds whatever x and combinations we take.
Á Generation Relation2
The Generation Relation2 postulate describes a feature of the Generation After construct. If a principal A can prove that x is generated at or after t, and x is a component of y, then A can prove that y is generated at or after t.
The Generation Relation3 postulate describes a relation between the Generation At construct and the Generation Before construct. If a principal A can prove that x is generated at t, and y is a component of x, then A can prove that y is generated before or at t.
The Generation Relation4 postulate describes a feature of the Generation Before construct. If a principal A can prove that x is generated before or at time t, and y is a component of x, then A can prove that y is also generated before or at time t.
Á Says At
The Says At postulate defines a principal's statement at a certain time. If a principal A can prove that x is generated before or at t, where x includes B's signature on y, then A can prove that B says y at t.
Reception postulates define reception accountability that represents when the message is received. These postulates are domain-specific provability properties.
Á Reception Before
The Reception Before postulate means that if a principal A receives y, which includes a message with the origin and the destination, C's signature on them, and B's signature on all, and if A can prove that y is generated before or at t, and that K C and K B authenticate C and B, respectively, then A can prove that B receives x before or at t from C.
From the second, fourth, and fifth statements of the Reception Before postulate and the Message Receipt
. We think that it is intuitively reasonable that if someone says something -for example, (x,C,B) -that has been already said by a different person, then the former person must have received the contents from the latter beforehand. Although we cannot reason whether the sender sent the message directly to the receiver or not, the contents with the delivery information, such as (x,C,B), can show the original sender and the final destination. We use the word 1ÅAE) as the origin of the message.
Á Reception After
The Reception After postulate means that if a principal A receives the message x with the origin and the destination, which is signed by C and B sequentially, and if A can prove that y is generated at or after t, and that K C and K B authenticate C and B, respectively, then A can prove that B receives x at or after t from C.
This postulate is intuitively reasonable, because if the original message can be proved to be generated at or after time t, the receiver cannot receive the message before time t. Therefore the receiver must receive the message at or after time t.
Á Reception During
The Reception During postulate is intuitively introduced on the basis of the Reception After and Reception Before postulates.
Protocol Analysis
In this section, we analyze the electronic submission protocol by applying the proposed temporal accountability logic. We apply the same analysis framework as that used in Kailar's work. It consists of stating the protocol's accountability goals, interpreting protocol messages, articulating the initial state assumptions, and analyzing each message. After analyzing the protocol, we can verify that all accountability goals can be obtained from the initial state assumptions and protocol message interpretations.
Accountability Goals
We present accountability goals for submission transactions according to the requirements stated in section 3. Although the following goals are neither necessary nor sufficient, they seem reasonable as general goals. 
Protocol Interpretation
Since an unsigned message has no effect on the achievement of goals in accountability logic, the following flows can be interpreted:
Initial State Assumptions
The initial state assumptions required in the analysis are as follows: 
Protocol Analysis

Á Message 1:
This preliminary flow is required when the general assumption N2 is made. When T receives message 1, T sees a notification service request tag (NR) and can prove the following statement by applying the Accountability postulate and the assumption A1.
This statement can be transformed by applying A5 and the Inference postulate.
T ÁÂÃÄÅAEÇÈ (B requests notification at time t s and t e .)
Á Message 2:
T sends a notification service acknowledgment in response to Message 1. When B receives message 2, B can prove the following statement by applying the Accountability postulate, A3, and A6.
B ÁÂÃÄÅAEÇÈ (T guarantees that T will notify B at times t s
and t e .)
Á Message 4:
When notified by T at t s , B instantly sends a description of the call for submission with his/her signature to T to be timestamped. Although we need a nonce value in the timestamp request message, we omit it for the readability purpose in this paper.
Á Message 5:
When B receives message 5, B can prove the following statement by applying the Generation Before and Says At postulate: Then the goal G2 can be achieved.
Á Message 8:
When B receives message 8, B can prove the statement that A generated his/her submission after the opening time for submission t s . Message 8 can be transformed as follows:
Using the above variables, A3, and A4, the statements
hold, and we can obtain the following from the Generation At postulate.
We can obtain the following statements from the Generation Relation1 and 2 postulates since w in u, and u in v.
The final statement is used in reasoning in message 10.
Á Messages 9 and 10:
B requests a timestamp with the value of message 8 in message 9. When B receives message 10, the following statement can be proved by applying the Generation Before postulate and the Reception Before postulate. Therefore, goals G1 and G5 can be finally achieved in messages 5, 7, 14, and 15.
Discussion
We further discuss on the protocol refinement by using temporal accountability logic and the accuracy of the receiver's clock.
Protocol Refinement
In the proposed protocol, the receiver has to acquire timestamps in proportion to the number of applicants. If the general assumption N4 is not made and the number of applicants increases greatly, the possibilities of a performance bottleneck problem at the timestamp server should be considered. By making some modifications to the original protocol, we can avoid this problem while protecting the security of the temporal transactions. We remove messages 9 and 10, and modify message 11 to {y i ÁK -1 B . Then, we can reduce the required number of timestamps per call for submission from n+2 to 2 (where n denotes the number of applicants), while maintaining the original security level in terms of temporal accountability. The difference lies in the time at which G3 is achieved for the receiver and G4 for applicants. After refinement, the receiver can acquire the proof of G3 in message 14, and the applicant can acquire the proof of G4 in message 15, at the closing time for submissions, because the Reception During postulate holds at that time. We think that this is a tradeoff problem between efficiency and usability. By adding one more modification to the previous refinement, applicants can acquire the proof of the goal G3 immediately after receiving the modified message 11 by executing an additional timestamping protocol with the timestamp server, which is similar to messages 9 and 10. We think that the last protocol is more optimal in terms of efficiency than the previously proposed one, because the applicants can decide when they should obtain the goal G3. As we have stated, the temporal accountability logic is effective for analyzing protocol and modifying messages, so that we can reduce the number of flows and improve protocol efficiency.
If the Receiver's Clock Is Accurate
We assume here that the general assumption N2 is not made and that the receiver is capable of synchronizing his/her local clock with another accurate clock. We can then omit the preliminary step, message 3 in the opening step, and message 12 in the closing step, because the receiver can begin the opening and closing steps without being notified by the timestamp server. Note that a verifier can still verify the temporal accuracy of the submission process by checking the values of the timestamps. If the requester's time is accurate, the verifier can reason that the receiver's clock is accurate and the whole process has been carried out correctly. Otherwise, the verifier can detect that the receiver's clock is not accurate or that the submission-receiving process has been carried out incorrectly. In the latter case, the accountability goal G1 cannot be obtained.
Conclusion
We have explained that electronic commerce applications are closely related to the security of temporal properties. We described possible attacks on temporal properties and proposed a defense measurement that assumes the existence of a trusted third-party of a timestamp server. We presented a secure electronic submission protocol as the most typical electronic commerce application that has a feature for temporal transactions. We also proposed the temporal accountability logic, which is capable of representing the provability of temporal activities, and analyzed the proposed protocol. We explained that the protocol can be refined by making some modifications to the original protocol while maintaining the original security level in terms of temporal accountability. Although the proposed logic does not attempt to solve all problems through temporal accountability, the logic is effective in analyzing protocol, and modifying messages, to improve the number of flows and improve protocol performance.
